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Modeling Tunnel Construction Risk Dynamics: Addressing 
the Production versus Protection Problem 
 
ABSTRACT 
Accidents remain a pervasive problem in tunnel construction. A major contributor to these 
accidents is the construction contractor’s inability to determine an appropriate trade-off between 
production and protection goals. Building upon previous research, a conceptual framework of the 
relationships between competing organizational goals and various technical risks is proposed. 
This framework forms the basis for a systemic ‘multiple methods’ model of the interactions 
between the contractor’s organizational and technical systems as a first step towards mitigating 
risks posed. Multiple methods are utilized given the complexity of risk factors that influence a 
system’s safety. Specifically, the model integrates System Dynamics (SD), Bayesian Belief 
Networks (BBN) and smooth Relevance Vector Machines (sRVM) (referred to as 
‘Organizational Risk Dynamics Observer’ (ORDO)). The final model developed is demonstrated 
on an urban metro tunnel project that was constructed in Wuhan, China. Organizational factors 
that influence the performance of a safe system of work and the shifting focus of management 
between production and protection goals are also examined. Findings suggest that when attention 
focuses upon production, the propensity for minor accidents to occur increased, which triggered 
management to focus on protection. Moreover, an increasing emphasis on protection may mute 
the safe systems of working as incidents go unreported thus inhibiting the motivation for safety 
awareness. When coupled with an increase in production pressure, the tunneling project becomes 
prone to experiencing a major accident. Therefore, the whole organization must continue to 
foster a sound safety culture to resist production pressure at the expense of compromising safety. 
 
Keywords: Risk modeling; safety management; tunnels; system dynamics; bayesian belief 
network; smooth relevance vector machine 
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INTRODUCTION  
Geotechnical conditions, structures and underground services/ pipelines can pose significant 
risks during the construction of tunneling projects. Such risks must be controlled to mitigate 
rework and accidents, and ensure that projects are delivered successfully. Yet, according to Sousa 
(2010) and Sousa and Einstein (2012) accidents during tunnel construction are frequent and 
adversely influence project performance. Research undertaken by Flyvbjerg et al., (2002) and 
Love et al., (2014) identified that cost overruns for tunnel construction projects can range 
between 20% to 110%. Examples of infamous tunnel accidents include the Sasago Tunnel (1977) 
in Japan, Boston’s Big Dig (2006) in the United States of America and Hangzhou Metro (2008) 
in China.  
 
Sousa (2010) classified the underlying causes of tunnel accidents as: internal, external 
management and adverse geotechnical conditions. These causes are not mutually exclusive 
because accidents encapsulate an array of circumstances (i.e. technical, managerial and 
organizational factors) that combine to produce the event (e.g., Perrow, 1984; Reason, 1990; 
Reason, 1997; Pidgeon, 2000; Dekker, 2006). Construction and engineering projects are complex 
systems that are bounded by protection and production axes (Reason, 1997; Goh et al., 2012). To 
ensure projects met performance specifications, organizations often face trade-offs between 
multiple (and sometimes conflicting) goals, which shape management decisions, policies or 
strategies (Love and Edwards, 2013; Rasmussen, 1997). Under such circumstances, Howell et al., 
(2003) observed that an organization’s safe system of working can erode from a state of being 
‘safe’ to ‘hazard’, and to ‘loss of control’ where safety margins evaporate.  
 
Due to limited prior knowledge of geotechnical conditions, tunnel projects are prone to failures 
due to collapse and excessive deformation as work progress (Cárdenas et al., 2013). In urban 
areas, tunneling also elevates the risk of damage to adjacent structures and pipelines (Eskesen et 
al., 2004). Thus, safety is imperative for contractors during construction despite pressures to 
meet performance specifications.  
 
Despite advances being made in tunneling technology and safety management measures, 
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accidents still prevail. To eradicate tunneling accidents requires a deeper understanding of the 
underlying dynamics that contribute to a phenomena entitled as strategic project drift (SPD) 
which elevates the risk of accidents. In the context of this research, SPD represents a movement 
away form a safe system of working due to schedule pressure and is similar to the ‘production 
versus protection problem (c.f. Marais and Saleh, 2008; Goh et al., 2012). Against this contextual 
backdrop, this paper first develops a conceptual framework of the relationships between different 
organizational goals and technical risks that may arise during tunnel construction. Second, a 
combination of multiple methods is utilized to model patterns that contribute to a project 
becoming ‘unsafe.’ A systemic model presented integrates System Dynamics (SD), Bayesian 
Belief Networks (BBN) and smooth Relevance Vector Machines (sRVM), called Organizational 
Risk Dynamics Observer (ORDO). The model’s application is demonstrated on an urban metro 
tunnel project that was constructed in Wuhan, China and presents an insightful opportunity to 
develop effective accident prevention strategies. 
 
SAFETY RISK ANALYSIS FOR TUNNELING PROJECTS: DEVELOPMENT, 
STIMULI AND CHALLENGES 
A plethora of safety risk analysis models for complex systems have been promulgated over the 
last 30 years (c.f. Perrow, 1984; Reason, 1997; Rasmusson, 1997; Leveson et al., 2009; Leveson, 
2011). Mohaghegh (2007) broadly categorized these models according to their underlying 
research paradigms as:  
 
i)  prescriptive models (early phase) – based upon the defense-in-depth concept, these use 
multiple safety barriers to achieve a safe system of working. An underlying philosophy is 
that accidents occur due to an absence or breach of defenses along the accident trajectory 
(Saleh et al., 2010). However, this concept is heavily reliant upon the identification and 
prevention of potential accident scenarios;  
ii)  descriptive models in terms of deviations from norms (first generation) – these focus upon 
errors or unsafe operations that lead to accident occurrence. Thus, the likelihood of an 
accident can be calculated using the predefined causal relationships, which arise due to 
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adverse events such as human error or technical failure. Examples of such models include 
fault and event trees (Sturk et al., 1996; Hong et al., 2009; Nývlt et al., 2011), Reason’s 
(1997) Swiss Cheese Model and the BBN technique (Ren et al., 2008). However, 
explanation of an accident in terms of events has been criticized for not being able to 
incorporate complex relationships such as delays and feedbacks (e.g. Rasmussen, 1997; 
Leveson, 2004). BBNs are also unable to reveal the underlying pattern that drives systems 
toward risks when subjected to cost-effectiveness pressure (Rasmussen, 1997; Leveson, 
2004). Rasmussen (1997) recognized the limitations of descriptive models and noted that 
“it is evident that a new approach to representation of system behavior is necessary, not 
focused on human errors and violations, but on the mechanisms generating behavior in the 
actual, dynamic work context.”; and   
iii)  descriptive models in terms of actual behavior (second generation) - these emphasize the 
systemic and collective nature of system behavior. Accidents are described as an emergent 
phenomenon that arise from the interactions between multiple agents within a 
socio-technical system. Examples of descriptive models include the Systems-Theoretic 
Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) model (Leveson, 2004), where safety is treated as 
a control problem and managed by a control structure embedded in an adaptive 
socio-technical system.  
 
Although systems-based methods have been used for accident analysis or risk assessment (e.g., 
Goh et al., 2010; Goh et al., 2012b; Ouyang et al., 2010; Salmon et al., 2012), only a small 
number have been developed for construction and engineering projects (Mitropoulos et al., 2005; 
Kazaras et al., 2012). Moreover, most systems models were qualitative thus preventing 
quantitative risk analysis. Recent representatives of quantitative safety risk models include 
STAMP (Dulac et al., 2005, Socio-Technical Risk Analysis (SoTeRiA) (Mohaghegh and Mosleh, 
2009; Mohaghegh et al., 2009) and Traffic Organization and Perturbation AnalyZer (TOPAZ) 
(Stroeve et al., 2009; Stroeve et al., 2011), which uses one or more techniques, such as SD, BBN, 
Monte Carlo simulation and agent-based simulation, to model the system risk. 
 
Stimuli of establishing a systemic safety risk model 
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Safety risk models used for tunnel construction are generally derived from the first-generation 
which recall the accident scenario to assist in the assignment of blame (e.g., Nývlt et al., 2011; 
Cárdenas et al., 2013). Punishment however, is not an effective strategy for learning from, or 
preventing future accidents (Dekker, 2011). Evidence reveals that even when people are 
dismissed for their mistakes, similar accidents may occur as the organizational and management 
settings that drive behavior remain unchanged (Ouyang et al., 2010). Whether second-generation 
safety risk models for tunnel projects are necessary depends on the goal of analysis, for example, 
to engineer a safer system that focuses upon mechanisms vis-à-vis causes (Leveson, 2004; Le 
Coze, 2013). 
 
Challenges of moving toward a second-generation model 
Numerous calls to propagate innovative ideas on safety risk analysis (Leveson 2004; Mohaghegh, 
2007; Kyriakidis et al., 2012) have produced frameworks that expand our understanding of risk 
(e.g., Mohaghegh and Mosleh, 2009; Stroeve et al., 2009). However, the complexity and 
multi-disciplinary nature of safety issues has created a lag between theoretical advancements and 
the development of methods and techniques with which to implement these (Pasquini et al., 
2011). Consequently, three major challenges have impeded progression from first to second 
generation safety risk models: 
 
From proximal factors to distal factors:  
Analysis of major accidents indicates that accident prevention must shift from a ‘technical’ (i.e. 
proximal causes) to an ‘organizational’ (i.e. distal antecedents and contributors causes) focus 
(Perrow, 1984; Reason, 1997; Kennedy and Kirwan, 1998). Because organizational factors are 
pivotal in almost all accidents, the organization provides a promising way for improving safety 
and for better understanding the ‘context’ of accidents (Le Coze, 2005; Leveson et al., 2009). Yet, 
few models explicitly encapsulate the impact of organization and management on safety 
performance (Mohaghegh et al., 2009). For example, whilst classical probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA) approaches quantify the mathematical probabilities and severities of system 
failures, they generally fail to incorporate organizational aspects that lead to failure (Bier 1999; 
Apostolakis, 2004). In part, this gap exists because technical and organizational systems are 
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dissimilar. Organizations are open and contain non-linear causalities which need systemic 
approaches to analyze, whereas technical systems are closed and linear causalities present can be 
studied using analytical methods (Le Coze, 2005). Tunneling projects are a socio-technical 
system and their performance is determined by the interaction between the physical construction 
processes and organizational elements. Therefore, integrating technical and organizational 
systems into one single model is critical to accurately determining the organizational risk factors 
or management shortcomings that elevate safety risk. 
 
From static analysis to dynamic modeling  
Most risk analyses are ‘static’ and focus on addressing the probabilities and consequences of 
accidents at a single point in time (e.g., Nývlt et al., 2011; Qu et al., 2011). However, tunneling 
works are dynamic processes where organizations involved are continually adapting in response 
to the prevailing external environmental and local pressures (Marais et al., 2004; Leveson, 2011). 
Accidents are therefore not the immediate result of a discrepant event, but rather a cumulative 
effect of various causes over an incubation period (Turner and Pidgeon 1997; Pidgeon and 
O'Leary, 2000). Moreover, unlike highly complex nuclear or petrochemical industries which 
have tightly-coupled systems, tunneling projects are highly-complex but loosely-coupled (Perrow, 
1984). Loosely coupled systems have fewer tight links between components, do not respond 
quickly to perturbations and may contain time delays. These characteristics can conceal incidents 
that indicate that a system has transitioned into a hazardous state (Marais et al., 2004; Lofquist, 
2010). Therefore, describing a system’s dynamic characteristics is a precondition for revealing 
the mechanism of migration toward increasing risks. 
 
From reductionism to holism  
A holistic perspective views a system as being more than the sum of its parts (Le Coze, 2005). 
For example, the safety of a shield-driven tunnel cannot be understood by merely evaluating the 
performance of a shield machine and operators but rather the human-machine interaction in the 
context of a dynamic environment, taking into consideration organizational and technical aspects 
(Leveson, 2009; Leveson, 2011). Therefore, a systemic safety risk model cannot be built by a 
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bottom-up aggregation of sub-models, but a top-down approach based on the concept of system 
thinking. Such a model has yet to be developed for tunneling works.  
 
A SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK FOR SAFETY RISK MODELING IN TUNNELING 
Organizations can be examined at a number of levels (e.g. micro, meso and macro) that focus on 
the individual, intra-organizational and inter-organizational behaviors or relations respectively 
(Stroeve et al., 2011). Modeling complex organizations using system theory can enable 
hierarchical levels to be sub-divided with control processes operating at the interfaces between 
them (Rasmussen, 1997). Thus, Rasmussen and Svedung (2002) and Leveson (2004), have 
proposed similar safety control models that incorporate a hierarchical structure with embedded 
social and organizational levels that interface with hazardous processes. Upper levels influence 
lower levels by laws, regulations, policies – while lower levels provide information and 
knowledge for the upper levels to make appropriate decisions. Higher levels require more time to 
make change (e.g. to pass safety legislation) whilst conversely, lower levels focus upon changing 
individual behaviors by referring to manuals or learning from past experiences.  
 
Figure 1 presents a conceptual framework for modeling risk in a tunnel project that is based upon 
a synthesis of former extant literature. The framework consists of five core components, namely: 
i) safety culture; ii) safety management practices; iii) safety performance and feedback; iv) the 
interaction of safety and other organizational goals; and v) modeling techniques applied to 
different modules. 
 
Safety culture 
Although no universally accepted definition for safety culture exists (Guldenmund, 2000), there 
appears to be commonality amongst the numerous definitions quoted within the literature 
(Wiegmann et al., 2002). For example, Choudhry et al. (2007b) defined construction safety 
culture as: “the product of individual and group behaviors, attitudes, norms and values, 
perceptions and thoughts that determine the commitment to, and style and proficiency of, an 
organization’s system and how its personnel act and react in terms of the company’s on-going 
safety performance within construction site environments.” Contrastingly, Zou (2011) offered an 
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alternative definition as: “an assembly of individual and group beliefs, norms, attitudes, and 
technical practices that are concerned with minimizing risks and exposure of workers and the 
public to unsafe acts and conditions in the construction environment.” Several studies have 
sought to identify and measure the dimensions of safety culture (Guldenmund, 2000), and whilst 
the number of dimensions differ (Guldenmund, 2000), management commitment to safety and 
safety performance are leitmotiv’s among these studies (e.g., Zohar, 1980; O’Toole, 2002; 
Mohamed, 2003; Fernández-Muñiz et al., 2007a; Brooks, 2008). Management commitment to 
safety is a determining factor that shapes management practices (Zou, 2011). For this paper, 
Mohaghegh et al.’s (2009) approach is adopted whereby management commitment to safety is 
used as a measure of safety culture. 
 
Safety management practices 
Safety management practices are a systematic and explicit approach to managing risks and 
hazards by organizing people, resources, policies and procedures interactively to reduce risk 
(Edwards, 1999; Fernández-Muñiz et al., 2007b; Dağdeviren and Yüksel, 2008). Thus, during 
tunnel construction, different counter-measures must be identified and accounted for to prevent 
undesired event occurrance. However, the constituent components of good safety management 
practice has, and remains a topic for much discussion (e.g., Santos-Reyes and Beard, 2002; Grote 
2012). From the literature, suggested components of good safety management synthesized and 
reproduced in Table 1 and notably some factors, such as safety training and education, are found 
replicated several times. Human resources are the mainstay of construction organizations, and 
education and training is pivotal to improving safety (Zou, 2011). However, economic 
perturbations and high employee turnover presents an on-going challenge for construction 
contractors that seek to implement effective safety education and training (Clough et al., 2000).  
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Safety performance and feedback 
Accident data is frequently used to measure an organization’s safety performance yet such data 
present lagging indicators that provide ‘hindsight’ not ‘foresight’ (Dyreborg, 2009). Leading 
indicators (foresight – such as near misses) provide useful predictors of safety performance 
levels because they observe weaknesses ahead of a serious incident occurring (Hinze et al., 
2013). Safety cannot be ensured by counting lagging indicators only, rather continuous 
monitoring of lagging indicators of past deficiencies and leading indicators of organizational 
processes and technical conditions are required (Reiman and Pietikäinen, 2012) Therefore, both 
the risk level and accident severity are adopted as leading and lagging indicators of safety 
performance respectively, and the counter-measures are classified into proactive measures and 
reactive measures in response to the two types of safety outcome (Lofquist, 2010).  
 
Counter-measures designed and implemented in response to safety performance can be seen as a 
learning process (Bellamy et al., 2008). For example, the adjustment of shield operational 
parameters to control tunneling-induced ground deformation risk level. However, learning by 
merely reacting to undesired outcomes (as per single loop learning (Agyris and Schon, 1996)) 
fails to adequately address individuals’ safety attitudes and awareness or organizational culture. 
This learning process is ‘controlling oriented’ as actions are modified based on the mismatch 
between desired outcomes and reality to minimize variation and avoid surprises (Carroll et al., 
2002). Instead, a deeper organizational learning strategy (e.g. double loop learning (Agyris and 
Schon, 1996)) is necessary to promote a sustainable positive safety culture (Pidgeon and O'Leary, 
2000; Sorensen, 2002; Choudhry et al., 2007b). Double loop learning is referred to as ‘rethinking 
oriented’ as the appropriateness of goals or basic cultural assumptions are challenged (Carroll et 
al., 2002). The major difference is that single-loop learning takes place under an organisation’s 
existing standards or norms, while the double-loop learning is the learning of standards or norms 
per se and requires more time to realize (Stäbler and Ewaldt, 1998). 
 
The interaction of safety and other organizational goals 
A recursive relationship exists between safety and production performance (Mohaghegh and 
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Mosleh, 2009). For tunneling projects, safety can influence cost and schedule performance, as 
accidents may result in financial losses and delays. Love et al. (2004) and Wanberg et al., (2013) 
found that the occurrence of construction rework adversely impacts upon cost, schedule and 
safety performance. Thus, safety culture is often negatively influenced when production pressure 
becomes a primary driver within organizations (Atak and Kingma, 2011). Accordingly, Reason 
(1998) has stated that: “the cultural accommodation between the pursuits of these goals of safety 
and production must achieve a delicate balance.”   
 
Modeling techniques applied to different modules 
Conventional methods used to perform technical risks analysis include Hazard and Operability 
Study (HAZOP) (Pérez-Marín and Rodríguez-Toral, 2013) and Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
(FMEA) (Mandal and Maiti, 2014). Yet, these techniques cannot capture the interaction and 
complexity associated between the organizational and technical systems or provide adequate 
analysis of organizational safety risks (Øien, 2001; Le Coze, 2005; Kongsvik et al., 2010). These 
aforementioned conventional analytical approaches tend to decompose the system (i.e. 
installation, plant and infrastructure) into parts and identify what cause-effect relationships 
produce hazardous sequences. Consequently, the recursive relations in organizations cannot be 
appropriately examined using them (Le Coze, 2005). Essentially, the dynamics at a project’s 
meso-level can be aggregated to micro and macro levels to enable the ‘bottom-up’ to meet ‘top 
down’ (Goldstein, 2010). In addressing this issue, SD can simulate interactions, decision-making 
processes and behaviors of a system at these various levels over a period of time (e.g., Sterman, 
2000; Goh et al., 2012; Stroeve et al., 2011). According to Goh et al. (2010) and Goh et al., 
(2012b) safety can be modelled at all levels as it forms part a project’s belief system and is 
embedded within an organization’s processes. Moreover, tunnel construction projects often 
experience unexpected events that may not immediately result in an accident but contribute to 
strategic drift toward a state of elevated accident risk (Love et al, 2002).  
 
The technical system in a tunnel construction project encapsulates tunneling processes and its 
impact upon surroundings. Physical tunneling processes can be modeled using finite element 
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model (FEM) (Kasper and Meschke, 2004). To control the scale of computation, a fast 
feedforward interpolator based on smooth Relevance Vector Machine (sRVM) for shield steering 
is applied (Ding et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2013b). The risks of tunneling-induced damage to 
existing properties were assessed using the Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) (Wang et al., 
2013a). Developing two models facilitates an estimate of risk levels and accident severities to be 
made; both of which are indicators of safety performance. In other words, safety performance is 
modeled beyond the SD environment. 
 
To investigate a tunneling project’s migration toward high risk, the SD models for the 
organization and technical systems are directly linked to simulate their dynamic interactions. The 
sRVM and BBN are then embedded into the SD environment to facilitate the exchange of data 
and enable modeling of the entire system. The proposed risk model is referred to as the 
Organizational Risk Dynamics Observer (ORDO) (refer to Figure 2) and is now discussed.  
 
CASE EXAMPLE: A METRO TUNNEL CONSTRUCTION  
An urban metro tunnel project constructed in Wuhan, China is used to develop the algorithms 
presented and analytical approach adopted in this research. The project has two lines (refer to 
Figures 3 and 4) which were constructed using a shield-driven machine which removes soil 
directly from the excavation face. To stabilize the excavation face and avoid tunnel settlement/ 
collapse (Maidl et al., 2012), the pressure provided by the shield machine must remain in 
equilibrium with the external earth pressure. Other nearby risks included damage to adjacent 
facilities and structures and therefore risk influencing factors (RIFs) needed to be identified by 
the contractor (Wang et al., 2013a). Ground surface settlement markers were installed above the 
tunnel’s centre line to effectively monitor and control potential risks. The first 100m of 
excavation was used to adjust the shield parameters to a suitable level according to the soil 
response and so consequently, settlement markers were deployed at 15m intervals. The 
remaining 1100m of tunnel thereafter deployed settlement markers at 30m intervals.  
 
The model developed was applied to construction of the line 1 tunnel which is 1.2 km long and 
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has an average cover depth ranging from 10 to 15m within predominantly clay soil. The tunnel 
was expected to be completed in 90 days at a cost of 267 million Chinese Yuan (CNY). Various 
sources of information generated during tunneling works were used for the ORDO model’s 
development (c.f. Figure 1); this information comprised of:  
 
 Field instrumentation data on ground surface settlement that were recorded daily near the 
excavation face; 
 Shield-machine operational parameters were continually monitored and included advance 
speed, earth pressure and grout filling;  
 Geological and geometrical parameters such as soil types at the tunnel crown and invert, 
cover depth and invert to water table; and  
 Adjacent structures and pipelines properties such as foundation depth and type, structure 
height, diameter of pipelines obtained from investigation documentation (cf. Figure 3). 
 
Using said data, the contractor determined major risks and their significance each day as a means 
of identifying safety counter-measures required. The contractor’s costs (amounting to 240 
million CNY plus 10% for overheads/ profit) were based upon monthly tunnel completion rates.  
 
Model development using hybrid modeling techniques 
The model’s development commences by integrating organizational processes and technical 
systems into one model to run the simulation. 
 
Modeling of organizational processes 
The organizational processes simulated in the SD environment involved four modules: i) 
management commitment to safety; ii) safety management practices; iii) finance; and iv) 
schedule. 
 
 Management commitment to safety module 
The module of management commitment to safety (Figure 5) is adapted from the work of 
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Mohaghegh et al.,’s (2009). The level of management commitment to safety was limited to 
an inverse linear scale of 0-100, where: 100 denotes the highest management commitment 
to safety; and 0 denotes the highest management commitment to production - the initial 
value is set to equilibrium (i.e. 50) at the outset of tunneling works. The tunnel works for 
each month is planned according to prevailing schedule pressure, which will indicate a 
demand for sufficient financial support. If production targets cannot be achieved due to 
financial pressure, management tend to emphasize on production which is positively 
influenced by the financial pressure (Goh et al., 2012). Consequently, the level of 
management commitment to safety tends to reduce. 
 
 Safety management practices module 
The safety management practices module is shown in Figure 6. High staff turnover rates in 
the construction industry (Clough et al., 2000), has underlined the importance of hiring 
new workers to achieve desired production rates. Hiring involves a process of attempting 
to reduce the gap between the current average worker workload and the reference workload 
defined by regulations. Note that a time lag is associated with the hiring process. Labor 
hiring and resigning processes also creates perturbations if workforce experience levels. To 
maintain competition and obtain better safety performance, construction companies may 
provide extensive staff training to maintain organizational performance; where the level of 
investment is inextricably linked to management commitment to safety. Training does have 
its cost in terms of direct capital investment and in-direct downtime needed to learn and 
absorb new skills and knowledge (refer to Figure 6). 
 
Implementing counter-measures is also a task of safety management practices. In practice, 
some workers are assigned to complete regular periodic maintenance works as the 
shield-machine advances (Edwards et al., 2003). In addition, various risk levels and 
accident severities require different amounts of preventive or postmortem measures, such 
as employing more labor or extending time required to fix a problem (i.e. single-loop 
learning). Therefore, workers must implement counter-measures in addition to regular 
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works; this creates a backlog of safety tasks needed and can exceed the acceptable 
workload of workers. This backlog affords a measure of fatigue, which may reduce 
working capacity, cause operation error and reduce human performance (Rasmussen et al., 
1990). Implementation these safety tasks is a managerial decision. When demand on safety 
workload exceeds the reference workload, management must decide whether safety tasks 
are first fulfilled regardless of the potential influence on production progress. 
 
 Schedule module 
Safety can influence a project’s schedule and vice-versa (refer to Figure 7). The 
shield-machine drills in between periodic scheduled maintenance and lining installation. 
Tunnel works are paid monthly according to production progress therefore, expedient 
excavation leads to greater recovery of payment. Advance speed is thus an important shield 
parameter because it determines payment and affects the schedule pressure that contributes 
to the change of management commitment to safety. 
 
 Finance module 
Interactions also exist between safety performance and financial status (refer to Figure 8). 
Because income is inextricably linked to schedule completion rates each month which in 
turn, requires sufficient financial support. Safety performance can also affect financial 
performance by way of compensation for accidents arising; where cumulative losses are 
related to accident severity and frequency. 
 
Modeling of technical systems 
The technical systems, which output the safety performance, consisted of two parts: i) shield 
tunneling processes; and ii) risk assessment. 
 
 Shield tunneling processes 
Shield tunneling is a control process that outputs desired products (e.g. metro tunnel) and 
by-products (e.g. tunneling-induced ground settlements) by inputting various parameters. A 
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monumental challenge involves ascertaining and controlling the development of ground 
surface settlement together with any potential collateral damage incurred. However, due to 
the complex and non-linear shield-ground interaction, numerous factors affect settlement 
and hence, an accurate prediction and control method is needed for steering shield 
tunneling. 
 
To model ground surface settlement development, a dynamic and real-time prediction 
method is adopted. The present settlement at a specific settlement marker st and affecting 
factors F are used as model inputs to predict the next settlement st+1, and the actual 
measurement of the next settlement is then taken as the present settlement for the next 
prediction. That is: 
),(1 Ftt sfs                                   (1) 
 
Factors that affect ground surface settlement can be categorized into three groups: i) tunnel 
geometry (e.g. cover depth and distance from excavation face to settlement markers); ii) 
geological conditions (e.g. soil types at tunnel crown and invert, and water table); and iii) 
shield operational parameters (e.g. advance speed, earth pressure and grout filling). The 
shield-ground relationship f(·) is established using a smooth relevance vector machine, 
which is a specialization of a sparse Bayesian model (Schmolck and Everson, 2007; 
Tipping, 2001). Therefore, the relationship between the affecting factors and settlement is 
obtained by training the model using collected data samples. 
 
Based on the established shield-ground relationship, the shield operational parameters can 
be optimized to control the development of settlement, thus a feedforward interpolator (cf. 
Ding et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2013b) is formed (refer to Figure 9).  
 
 Tunneling risk assessment 
A contractor must assess the major risks prior to, and during tunneling so that risk 
mitigation measures can be designed and implemented. Wang et al., (2013a) proposed a 
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hierarchical framework to describe the risk propagation from the RIFs to the final risks; 
Bayesian belief networks were then applied to formalize the framework. Historical data 
and elicited expert domain knowledge are combined to quantify the final model. This 
approach (ibid) allowed risk scenarios to be identified and the probabilities associated with 
these to be calculated (cf. Kaplan and Garrick, 1981). The risk assessment model’s 
structure is presented in Figure 10. 
 
To determine the risk level, the decision matrix risk-assessment (DMRA) method is 
adopted because it can differentiate relative risks to facilitate consistent decision-making 
(Marhavilas et al., 2011). During tunneling works, the frequency of occurrence and 
severity of consequences are classified (cf. Tables 2 and 3). The risk criteria are presented 
as a risk matrix considering the two parameters of risk magnitude (Figure 11). The DMRA 
method compares the assessment results to the risk matrix to determine the risk level 
(negligible, acceptable, unwanted and unacceptable), which is subsequently used to guide 
further actions (Table 4) (cf. Wang et al., 2013a). 
 
Linking organizational processes and technical systems 
The ORDO model’s structure (see Figure 12) consists of different modules that are integrated to 
run the simulation as a single model. These modules are now further elucidated upon. 
 
 Tuning the advance speed (Link A) 
Advance speed is a critical factor that relates to tunneling safety and production. In this 
research, adjustment of the shield operational parameter acts as a trigger to denote the 
contractor’s efforts to balance safety and production goals in equilibrium. Fast tunnel 
boring can elevate risks posed and therefore, the optimized advance speed (which aims to 
control settlement development) represents safety-oriented speed Vs. Conversely, schedule 
pressure requires a minimum advance speed which represents production-oriented speed Vp. 
This research assumes that the decision on setting of the parameter V is a linear 
combination of the safety-oriented and production-oriented decisions, which gives: 
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where C: is the level of management commitment to safety (on a scale of 0-100). Once 
advance speed is tuned, ground surface settlement and shield parameters optimization can 
be analyzed.  
 
 Inferring the RIFs (Link B) 
The differential settlement of structures and pipelines are critical RIFs contributing to 
tunneling risks (Wang et al., 2013a). In this research, the differential settlement is inferred 
based on the predicted ground surface settlement, for example, Figure 13 illustrates 
tunneling-induced damages to adjacent structures. The inclination δ can be calculated using 
Eq. (3): 
 
L
s
                                     (3) 
 
Where: Δs is the differential settlement; ξ is the reduction coefficient which depends upon 
the structure’s stiffness; and L is the length of the structure perpendicular to the tunnel 
alignment. If the ground surface settlement above the tunnel center line Smax is given, Δs 
can be approximated using Peck’s formula (Peck, 1969): 
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Where: x is the lateral distance from the tunnel alignment to the structure; i=kZ is the 
inflection point; and Z is the tunnel depth. The value for k is taken as 0.5 for cohesive soils 
and 0.25 for granular soils. Once all RIFs are quantified, risks assessment commences 
using the risk assessment model. 
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 Safety performance indicators feedback to organizations (Link C) 
The risk level and accident severity are two indicators of organizational safety performance. 
Different risk levels and accident severities require alternative amounts of remedial works 
(single-loop learning) and lead to bespoke levels of safety pressure that impacts the 
management commitment towards safety (double-loop learning). To model the influence of 
accidents, accident severity is simulated based on the assessed probabilities and 
consequences of a hazard, and the accident caused losses in Figure 8 is determined 
according to Table 3. 
 
 Safety management practices influence safety performance (Link D) 
Safety management practices impact upon the effectiveness of counter-measures employed 
(i.e. are such measures implemented appropriately and timely). This can be determined via 
the average experience of workers and backlog of counter-measures implemented. Without 
available data for this aggregation, expert knowledge is exploited using fuzzy logic to 
calculate the fuzzy membership of the states of effectiveness for counter-measures (Taroun 
et al., 2011), and the membership degree is then transformed to the probability using Eq. (5) 
(Singpurwalla and Booker, 2004): 
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indicates the likelihood ratio of membership function; and 
)
~
(
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(
AxP
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

 is the prior odds. 
Because there is no prior knowledge for the classification, the prior odds are set to 1 in the 
model. 
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By linking the organizational process and the technical system, different modules are 
integrated into a single model. However, because modules are run in different software 
environments, Microsoft Excel is used for importing and exporting data. 
 
MODEL EVALUATION 
The proposed feedforward interpolator was validated in a previous metro tunneling project (Ding 
et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2013b). Mean squared error (MSE) and mean absolute percentage error 
(MAPE) measures of evaluation were adopted to assess prediction capacity, whilst the relative 
importance of factors identified by the model was compared via sensitivity analysis. Results 
indicated that the model performed well and the method of adjusting the shield operational 
parameters based on the established model was also feasible. 
 
The BBN model was also applied to a metro tunneling project (Wang et al., 2013a). The 
classifications of the status of existing properties were compared to the actual observations and 
the input parameters of the RIFs were varied to observe model output changes. 
 
The organizational models were partly modified based on previous works. For example, the 
management commitment to safety module and hiring and training processes were adapted from 
Cooke’s and Mohaghegh’s models (Cooke, 2004; Mohaghegh, 2007). Other modules were 
constructed based on interviews with engineers and managers (Yu et al., 2014). In addition, three 
eminent safety scholars with tunneling experience reviewed the whole model structure to report 
upon any major discrepancy between the model and reality. 
 
●  Schedule performance 
Schedule performance is presented in Figure 14. The stairs diagram indicates the tunneling 
project’s progress while the line shows the average daily advance speed. Although 
completed on time, the average tunneling advance speed varied significantly between a 
relatively low initial speed which increased significantly during the last month. 
 
 
 21 
 
●  Financial performance 
Figure 15 shows the project’s financial status relative to accident caused financial loss. 
Most simulated accidents are ‘insignificant’ or ‘considerable’, except for two ‘serious’ 
accidents on days 64 and 77. The difference between the initial value and the final financial 
value indicates total profit. Due to accidents, profits dramatically reduced to 1.46%, from 
an expected 10.11% to 8.65%. 
 
●  Safety performance 
The variance of safety performance indicators (i.e. risk level and accident severity), are 
presented in Figure 16. The overall risk level is labeled ‘negligible’ for 45 days and 
‘acceptable’ for 42 days respectively. The ‘unwanted’ risk level appears at days 64, 65 and 
76, with two ‘serious’ accidents that occurred. Notably, the accidents and high risk level 
appears more frequently in the second half of the construction period, implying a 
downward safety performance. 
 
To better present risk migration measures employed, the spatio-temporal dynamics of 
tunneling-induced damage risks to ground surface, adjacent structures and pipelines are shown in 
Figure 17. The abscissa stands for time and the ordinate indicates the section of excavation face. 
The risks of tunneling-induced damage to ground surface, adjacent structures and pipelines are 
represented by circle, triangular and square markers, with different colors indicating the risk 
levels (i.e. acceptable: yellow; unwanted: orange, unacceptable: red). For example, the 
excavation face reaches Section 256.64m at day 20 and the building located at section 250m (i.e. 
S4 in Figure 3), namely 6.64m behind the excavation face, and is assessed as being at an 
‘acceptable’ risk level. Similarly, the pipeline located at section 820m (i.e. P3 in Figure 3) 
reaches high risk level as the shield machine approaches and recedes from section 808.14m to 
848.52m, and the risks of tunneling-induced damage to adjacent structure, pipeline and ground 
surface reaches ‘acceptable’ simultaneously at day 77, which leads the tunneling project to the 
‘unwanted’ risk level for 3 days.  
DISCUSSION 
The simulation results illustrate that management commitment to safety varies during 
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construction works (refer to Figure 18). As risk mitigation activities were initially implemented 
(e.g. improve safety training and low backlog of safety tasks – Figures 19 and 20), the assessed 
risk level was low and no accidents occurred, resulting in a consequential shift of management 
focus to production. Production continued to increase until low-cost accidents (i.e. insignificant 
or considerable accidents) occurred, which can lead to improvement in protection. However, an 
increased focus on protection may reduce the apparent absence of accidents and risks, triggering 
a decline in safety awareness. Consequently, the level of protection is then gradually eroded until 
another accident occurred or high risks are perceived. These dynamics are captured in Figure 19 
as the management commitment to safety fluctuated over time; this phenomenon can be 
understood as the archetypes of decreasing safety consciousness and complacency (Marais et al., 
2006). Safety awareness can be reinforced by increasing the number of incidents and the system 
safety is improved by efforts to reduce incidents. But the absence of incidents renders the system 
mute and may create complacency. As production pressures increase, adherence to protection 
activities that seem draconian and unnecessarily costly may erode, eventually elevating accident 
risk. 
 
As the analysis demonstrates, previously low-cost accidents can engender increasing production 
pressure. In addition, efforts to reduce accidents gradually decreased safety awareness as the 
management commitment declined after day 40. Although several insignificant or considerable 
accidents occurred around day 50, the level of management commitment increased slowly due to 
the time lag of management commitment change and high production pressure. Unwanted risk 
levels and a serious accident were observed around day 65 as the shield machine happened to 
underpass a pipeline (P3 in Figure 3). This is in line with Reason’s Swiss cheese model (1997), 
whereby the latent failures, occurs at the managerial and organizational level, and combine 
adversely with local triggering events that cause an organizational accident. In this case, the 
production pressure continually forced the system to move outside the safety margin where 
serious accidents were actually waiting to release (Rasmussen, 1997). The unexpected incidents 
triggered a vicious cycle, which occurred after the remedies and a stronger management focus on 
production was encouraged due to the demanding schedule. Consequently, a second serious 
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accident occurred at day 78. 
 
Detailed investigation of the two accidents also found a high backlog of safety tasks prior to the 
events (cf. Figure 21). This is better understood as the archetype of side-effect of safety fixes 
(Marais et al., 2006). Once high risk is perceived or an accident occurs, the natural act is to fix 
the symptoms rather than address root causes. The analysis implies that a project organization 
has to continually foster a good safety culture that maintains a high level of safety awareness. 
High risks and major accidents are preceded by incidents such as low-cost accidents or perceived 
low level risks (Goh et al., 2012). The possible solution is to adjust the production goal so that 
the project organization can invest more in protection to ensure a sustainable safety state where 
skilled workers can implement counter-measures without heavy time pressures. Moreover, as the 
absence of incidents may decrease a project’s organizational safety awareness, the leading 
indicators of safety performance should be monitored and the threshold of low risk should be 
enhanced to remind the organization that risk is not negligible.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Investigation of recent large-scale accidents during tunnel construction continued to cite 
organizational management as a major contributory factor. Tunneling projects are socio-technical 
systems where their performance is determined by the interaction between the organizational 
processes and technical systems. Although both organizational and technical dimensions should 
be incorporated into safety risk analysis, limited effort has been made to integrate these two parts 
to investigate a safety system’s behavior. This is perhaps due to a highly complex and loosely 
coupled tunnel construction process which requires dynamic modeling techniques applied to 
different modules from a systems perspective. This study developed a systemic safety risk model 
that takes into account this challenge.  
 
A conceptual framework proposed depicted the relationships between different organizational 
goals, and examined how organizational factors interact with technical risks. The aim was to 
obtain a broader picture of the etiology of a system breakdown so that the interaction of 
organizational management and technical failures within the ‘production and protection’ 
 24 
 
constraint could be addressed. Within the framework, a model called ‘ORDO’ was established by 
embedding the technical models into the organizational processes in the SD environments. A 
large amount of diverse data was collected from a metro tunnel construction case provided an 
opportunity to run simulations. Results demonstrated the dynamics of system migration toward 
high risk under the pressure of production. The analysis of the mechanisms of risk dynamics 
implied that the possible solutions to resist safety system drift from a ‘safety zone’ to a 
‘hazardous state.’ In order to establish a robust safety culture, construction managers and staff 
must continue to champion the philosophy of safety first and monitor safety performance 
indicators. This will include learning lessons and feeding them back into management practices, 
particularly in the face of increasing production pressure. In certain circumstances, the 
production goal has to be compromised to maintain system safety. 
 
The example application sought to explore the feasibility of the proposed hybrid methodology 
rather than performing a comprehensive and realistic numerical estimation of the tunneling risks. 
By using this approach, the dynamic influence of organizational factors on technical system 
safety risk and its feedback is presented. Future work is however required to: i) investigate the 
inter-organizational relationships between stakeholders (owner, contractor, supervisors etc.) and 
how these impact upon tunneling performance; and ii) expand the research scope to examine the 
effects of different managerial factors on safety performance. Manipulation of these factors will 
allow output changes to be recorded (as a first step towards improving model applicability) but 
such work requires an abundance of data to support quantitative modelling.   
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Figure 1 - A framework for risk modeling on tunneling projects. 
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Table 1 - Examples of the good safety management practices. 
Authors Major components/factors Total No. of 
Components 
Domain Country Research method* 
Tam et al. (2002) Safety audit scheme, Safety training, Competency of supervision, Management 
involvement, Safety promotion 
7 Construction Hong Kong NSFDSS 
Fang et al. (2004) Safety inspection, Safety meeting, Safety regulation enforcement, Safety 
education, Safety communication 
11 Construction China FA 
Teo and Ling (2006) Personnel factor, Incentive factor, Process factor, Policy factor 4 Construction Singapore AHP+FA 
Fernández-Muñiz et al. 
(2007b) 
Internal control, Communication, Training, Preventive planning, Incentives 8 Multiple Spain exploratory/ 
confirmatory FA 
Dağdeviren and Yüksel 
(2008) 
Organizational factors, Personal factors, Job related factors, Environmental factors 4 Manufacture Turkey fuzzy AHP 
Aksorn and 
Hadikusumo (2008) 
Management support, Safety education and training, Teamwork, Clear and realistic 
goals, Effective enforcement scheme 
16 Construction Thailand FA 
Chen et al., (2009) Management promises and support, Plan- do-check-action continuous 
improvement, Participation of employees, Education and training, Internal auditing 
system 
12 Manufacture Taiwan FA 
Hsu et al., (2010) Safety policy, Safety culture, Communication, Training, Identification and 
maintenance of applicable regulations 
13 Aviation Taiwan hybrid 
(GRA+DEMATEL+
ANP) 
Ramli et al., 
(2011) 
Safety policy and program, Hazard identification and workplace assessment, Risk 
control strategies, Training strategy, Consultation sessions 
6 Multiple Malaysia possibilistic RA 
Ismail et al., 
(2012) 
Personal factor, Management factor, Human resource management/Incentive 
factor, Resources factor, Relationship factor 
5 Construction Various Statistics (survey) 
* NSFDSS: non-structural fuzzy decision support system; FA: factor analysis; AHP: analytic hierarchy process; GRA: grey relational analysis; DEMATEL: decision making trial evaluation laboratory; ANP: 
analytic network process; RA: regression analysis.
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Figure 2 - Integration of SD, BBN and sRVM, and data exchange method. 
 
SD
BBNsRVM
EXCEL
Inferred Settlement of 
ground/structures/pipelines
O
p
tim
ized
 ad
van
ce sp
eed
A
ctu
al
 ad
van
ce sp
eed
E
ff
ec
ti
ve
n
es
s 
of
 c
ou
n
te
r-
m
ea
su
re
s
R
is
k
 l
ev
el
/
ac
ci
d
en
t 
se
ve
ri
ty
 
 
 
 
 38 
 
Figure 3 - Layout of the metro tunnel project. 
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Figure 4 - Longitudinal profile of the metro tunnel project. 
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Figure 5 - Management commitment to safety module. 
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Figure 6 - Safety management practices module. 
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Figure 7 - Schedule module. 
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Figure 8 - Financial module. 
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Figure 9 - Feedforward analysis for shield-ground system. 
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Figure 10 - Risk assessment model structure in the tunnel case. 
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Table 2 - Frequency classification (adapted from Eskesen et al., (2004)). 
Frequency class Interval Central value Descriptive frequency class 
6 >0.3 1 Very likely 
5 0.03 to 0.3 0.1 Likely 
4 0.003 to 0.03 0.01 Occasional 
3 0.0003 to 0.003 0.001 Unlikely 
2 0.00003 to 0.0003 0.0001 Very unlikely 
1 <0.00003 0.00001 Nearly impossible 
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Table 3 - Consequence classification (adapted from Eskesen et al. (2004)). 
Damage to 
third party 
Disastrous Severe Serious Considerable Insignificant No impact 
Loss in 
Million Euro 
>3 0.3–3 0.03–0.3 0.003–0.03 0–0.003 0 
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Figure 11 - Risk matrix in the tunnel case (adapted from Eskesen et al., (2004)). 
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Table 4 - Examples of actions for different risk level (Eskesen et al. (2004)). 
Risk level Descriptions 
Unacceptable The risk shall be reduced at least to Unwanted regardless of the costs of risk mitigation. 
Unwanted Risk mitigation measures shall be identified. The measures shall be implemented as long as 
the costs of the measures are not disproportionate with the risk reduction obtained (as low as 
reasonably practicable (ALARP) principle). 
Acceptable The hazard shall be managed throughout the project. Consideration of risk mitigation is not 
required. 
Negligible No further consideration of the hazard is needed. 
 
 50 
 
Figure 12 - Organizational Risk Dynamics Observer (ORDO). 
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Figure 13 - Schematic diagram of tunneling-induced damages to adjacent structures. 
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Figure 14 - The organizational schedule performance 
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Figure 15 - The project’s financial performance 
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Figure 16 - The organizational safety performance indicators 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
 
 
 
 
R
is
k
 l
e
v
e
l
t (day)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
c
c
id
e
n
t 
s
e
v
e
ri
ty
U
n
a
c
c
e
p
ta
b
le
U
n
w
a
n
te
d
A
c
c
e
p
ta
b
le
N
e
g
lig
ib
le
D
is
a
s
tr
o
u
s
S
e
v
e
re
S
e
ri
o
u
s
C
o
n
s
id
e
ra
b
le
In
s
ig
n
if
ic
a
n
t
N
o
 i
m
p
a
c
t
Risk level
Accident severity
 
 55 
 
Figure 17 - The spatio-temporal diagram of organizational risk dynamics 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
t (day)
S
e
c
ti
o
n
 (
m
)
 
 
structure risk level
pipeline risk level
ground risk level
excavation face
 
 56 
 
Figure 18 - Management commitment to safety over the construction period 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
t (day)
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
c
o
m
m
it
m
e
n
t 
to
 s
a
fe
ty
 (
%
)
 
 57 
 
Figure 19 - Variance of average experience 
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Figure 20 - Backlog of the safety tasks during tunneling 
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